A Civil War General and His Strategic Tantrum

The Battle of Atlanta was a strategic victory for the Union during the Civil War

By JIM PURCELL

"There is nothing so close to God in Heaven as a general on the battlefield." 

-- Major General Joshua L. Chamberlain, United States Army (1863)

How much ego is too much ego, even by a general on a battlefield? I suppose that any soldier, of any rank, would draw the line at the point where ego costs lives. Those same solders might offer, afterward, that the purpose of soldiers and armies is to save lives by ending armed conflicts and restoring peace where it is vitally needed. 

Major General John Palmer

   Then there is the case of the commander of the XIV U.S. Corps during the Civil War, at the critical juncture of the close of the Battle of Atlanta. How petty can senior officers be, even with an enemy directly in front of them?

The Case of MG J. Palmer and His Date of Rank

   On August 6, 1864, Union Major General John M. Palmer (1817-1900) resigned as commander of the XIV Corps during the Battle of Atlanta, then being led overall by MG William T. Sherman. Why did he do it? Because Sherman had placed Palmer's corps under the operational control of Major General John M. Schofield for one maneuver in the closing battles within the campaign.

   According to Sherman, during August, 1864, when the capture of Atlanta seemed likely for Union forces, Schofield's corps was on the extreme right of the forward edge of the battle area. Schofield's forces were operating neat East Point, Georgia. Major General George H. Thomas and elements of his Army of the Cumberland held the center of the FEBA, with Major General Oliver O. Howard's XI Corps on the right.

J. Palmer after the war

   Sherman went on to say that, after reports from his cavalry, he came to believe that only a substantial element, like Schofield's corps, reinforced by more units, could successfully take and hold the railroad just below Atlanta. Schofield had his own corps, the XXIII, comprised of 11,075 infantry soldiers and 885 artillery soldiers. Schofield was also reinforced with 1,700 cavalry soldiers, and Sherman placed Palmer's XIV Corps under Schofield's operational control. Palmer's corps, at that time, numbered about 17,300 soldiers.

   On the eve of this massive maneuver by Sherman, though, a definite wrinkle happened when Palmer, a politician by trade before and after the war, insisted that he outranked Schofield, a career soldier and West Point graduate, by date of rank. In Army lingo that means, because Palmer was given his two stars before Schofield, he technically outranked him. While this is certainly a conversation to have in a garrison environment, having this debate in the middle of a major battle isn't appreciated by anyone, except the enemy (in this case, Atlanta defender Major General John B. Hood).

LTG William T. Sherman

   Consequently, Palmer denied that Schofield had any right to command him, and his troops, during this maneuver. As soon as Palmer's dissent was reported to Sherman, the overall commander of the battle decided that Schofield, in fact, out-ranked Palmer. On August 4th, in a letter to Palmer, Sherman wrote:

   "From the statements made by yourself and Gen. Schofield today, my decision is that he outranks you as a major general, being of the same date as present commission, by reason of his previous superior rank as brigadier general. The movements of tomorrow are so important that the orders of the superior on that flank must be regarded as military orders, and not in the nature of cooperation. I did hope there would be no necessity for my making that decision; but it is better for all parties interested that no question of rank should occur in actual battle. The Sandtown Road, and the railroad if possible, must be gained tomorrow, if it costs half your command. I regard the loss of time this afternoon as equal to the loss of 2,000 men."

   After this tantrum by Palmer was about fizzled out, Palmer showed up at Sherman's location and offered his resignation. Sherman said that he advised Palmer to give up his 'argument' with Schofield and to return to command his troops. Sherman noted that, if it came out later, Palmer's motives might be misconstrued and impact his civil career after the war. Palmer was determined, though. Finally, Sherman told Palmer that if he wished to resign he would need to do so through Schofield. So, Palmer got atop his horse again and rode to Schofield's headquarters, where he offered his resignation.

MG John Schofield

   On Aug. 6th, Schofield forwarded Palmer's resignation to Sherman, and suggested it be accepted. It was and Palmer was immediately replaced by Brig. Gen. Richard Johnson, a senior division commander within the XIV Corps. Meanwhile, in the wake of his resignation, Palmer was sent back to his home state of Illinois to await orders from the Army.

After His Resignation

   John M. Palmer was nothing if not a politician. After taking a break in Ilinois for some months, Palmer was next assigned as the military governor of the state of Kentucky. Once there, he reasserted Federal control of the region and helped to eliminate Confederate geurillas that still operated beyond the peace of April 9, 1865.

   In 1866, Palmer resigned from the Army entirely and, two years later, won the governship of Illinois. Later, Palmer would serve in the U.S. Senate and made a failed run for president of the United States in 1896.

   John M. Palmer finally died of a heart attack on September 25, 1900 in Springfield, Illinois.

The Historical Take-Away
   There was no chance that the regular officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted men of the XIV Cops knew that their commanding officer was delaying a military action against the forces of the Confederate Army located outside Atlanta, or that he was having a strategic hissy fit over his time in grade over that of a career soldier. They knew what was right in front of them, because if they had known what was going on it would have impacted the ability of the corps to fight. Morale is a key element to any unit, in any army, anywhere.

The standard for the XIV Corps

   Leaders need to demonstrate solidarity. Actually, solidarity needs to happen, ideally, from the lowest private to the commander of an army, any army of any era or time or conflict. It is taken for granted that, as terrible as it is, people will die during war, combatants and, even more sadly, non-combatants. It is such a serious business that the trivial cannot, nor should not, ever take center stage within an army in the field.

   If MG Palmer had been an NCO on a U.S. Navy ship at war, and had pulled what he did, he would no doubt be charged with mutiny and nothing good would happen from there. But, because he was a general, and basically a politician even while he was in uniform, he got a pass and went on to great things, even touting his Civil War combat record.

   There is an old saying which states: 'Stuff rolls downs hill.' Apparently, though, given a privileged situation in life, that is not always the case -- even when soldiers' lives hang in the balance.


Sources Used:

"Memoirs of Gen. William T. Sherman, Volume 2," by Wm. T. Sherman and W. Fletcher Johnson, published by D. Appleton & Co., New York, NY (1891), ppgs 96-101

(Jim Purcell is a historian and retired print journalist. During his time in the U.S. military, among other posts, he was assigned as the NCOIC of the S-2, 4th Battalion, 41st Infantry Regiment, 2nd Armored Division (Forward). He currently resides in Western North Carolina with his wife, Lita.)